

D 101.22: 550-100
GOV PUB

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY PAMPHLET

NO. 550-100

UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO



A14408 002790

U.S. Army Handbook
of
COUNTERINSURGENCY GUIDELINES
for
AREA COMMANDERS

AN ANALYSIS OF CRITERIA

ZIMMERMAN LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO

AUG 9 1976

REGIONAL DEPOSITORY

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
JANUARY 1966

Prepared for the Department of the Army

by

Special Operations Research Office

The American University

5010 Wisconsin Avenue, NW.

Washington, D.C. 20016

Co-Authors

M. D. Havron

J. A. Whittenburg

A. T. Rambo

FOREWORD

The Special Operations Research Office (SORO) of The American University, a nongovernmental agency operating under contract with the Department of the Army, performs social science research in support of requirements stated by the Department of the Army staff agencies and other Army elements.

The contents of SORO publications, including any conclusions or recommendations, represent the views of SORO or subcontractors and should not be considered as having official Department of the Army approval, either expressed or implied. Reproduction in whole or in part is permitted for any purpose of the United States Government.

This particular study was initiated upon the request of the Special Operations Directorate, ODCSOPS. Comments and questions on this report are invited and should be addressed to:

Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations
Attn: OPS SO
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310.

Comments and questions on the overall Army social science research program are also invited and should be addressed to:

Office, Chief of Research and Development
Attn: Social Science Research Office
Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

TASK TACO

SUBTASK

Nonmateriel Factors in Counter guerrilla Operations

Research and writing were completed in

February 1965

PREFACE

Insurgency probably dates back to the beginning of organized society and certainly to the advent of the city-state form of government. The strategies and tactics of counterinsurgency are many and have varied widely. Measures have ranged from political reforms to harsh military action, from relocation to civic action and from friendly, persuasive appeals to coercive block warden systems. In some cases the policies and programs have been effective, and in others they have failed. Surprisingly, lessons learned from one counterinsurgency have not always been effective in the next. In order to better understand this complex phenomenon, standards or criteria for evaluating the selection of counterinsurgency plans and criteria for evaluating the implementation of various counterinsurgency programs must be devised.

Within this context there is need for a systematic treatment of criterion methodology which deals with criteria for insurgency/counterinsurgency. Until appropriate sets of criteria can be formulated and evaluated there is no systematic way to evaluate the progress, success or failure of a counterinsurgency plan, program, project or task.

This report describes the exploratory efforts to develop basic concepts for formulating and interpreting criteria pertinent to the counterinsurgency at the operational area level. It elaborates the role of the area commander with emphasis on decision-making functions, alternatives and guidelines for his evaluation. Although a great deal of work remains to be done in counterinsurgency criteria development, this report is a first step, one which specifies immediate problems as well as directions for future effort.

Appendix A

morale by government forces increases insurgent resolve so that the prophecies and expectations of both sides are self-fulfilling. The insurgent command is as much concerned with manipulation of expectations of both sides as with victory in small unit military operations.

APPENDIX B INTERVIEW SCENARIO

This appendix presents a technique for studying the decision process in simulated counterinsurgency situations and includes a complete copy of the instructions and background materials provided each interview subject.

A TECHNIQUE FOR STUDYING THE DECISION PROCESS IN SIMULATED COUNTERINSURGENCY SITUATIONS

The following statements include information and instructions related to the administration of the enclosed simulated insurgency situations. Your cooperation and participation in this endeavor will contribute to a better understanding of the many considerations that make up the decision process in a counterinsurgency context. It is hoped, ultimately, that the information generated by application of this technique will lead to the evolution of operationally meaningful decision guidelines for use by individuals assigned to either advise, support, or direct counterinsurgent operations at the operational area level.

INFORMATION

1. The enclosed materials contain both graphic and written descriptions covering a hypothetical geographic area, i.e., the Toledo District, located in the country of Centralia.
2. The descriptive materials provide both background and current situational information about the Toledo District.
3. You, acting as the Operational Area Commander, are assigned the primary counterinsurgent responsibility in the Toledo District.
4. The attached information is intended to provide you with the necessary context: (1) to assign priorities to operational objectives based on your assessment of the situation, (2) to devise or select a solution concept (strategy/tactic) to attain the objective(s), and (3) to allocate necessary resources based on your selected/devised solution concept.
5. The goal of this particular effort is threefold (1) to explore the utility of this technique as a way of generating a wide variety of

Appendix B

alternative solution concepts for a given situation, (2) to identify considerations associated with a given operational objective, i.e., criteria used to guide the selection or development of solutions with which to meet specific objectives, and (3) to isolate some of the major situational factors which influence the relative importance of these considerations or criteria.

MATERIALS

Background materials in the package include:

A. Section I: Written description of the national level background, including the country's political history and current political situation, economic status, social structure and processes, and cultural characteristics.

B. Section II: Written and graphic descriptions of the area level background—geographic, social, economic, cultural, and political—involving similar types of information to that presented in section I, but specific to the Toledo District.

C. Section III: Written and graphic descriptions of the area level government; its responsibilities, structure, and resources.

D. Section IV: Current situational information includes:

1. Description of incidents for a one-week period of an insurgency.
2. Map showing location of the incidents.

PROCEDURE

Step 1: Review the national level background material. *Section I.*

Step 2: Review the area description and the maps graphically depicting background information. A general familiarity with the Toledo District is the goal of step 2. *Section II and Maps A-E.*

Step 3: Review the written and graphic material on the resources available to District Commissioner. *Section III and Map F.*

Step 4: Read the material and study the map which serves to describe and locate the incidents. These incidents, as far as they are reported, are accurate. *Section IV and Map G.*

(Steps 1-4 are designed for independent implementation by the informant. Steps 5-8 are to be done only in the presence of the interviewer.)

Step 5: Provide your assessment of the situation. Identify the particular factors which contribute to your situation diagnosis.

Step 6: Reference the list of attached operational objectives. Select one or more objectives which you judge require immediate attention. Discuss the reasons for this selection with respect to (1) the present situation, (2) whether the selection represents short- or long-range objective(s), and (3) the reasons/factors based on your own prior

Appendix B

experience, knowledge, and ideas in the area of counterinsurgency. (You may suggest objectives other than those that appear on the list.)

There are three constraints limiting your selection of operational objectives.

(1) You must select those objectives most likely to successfully counter the insurgency while leaving your government in power—surrender or defection with your forces to the insurgents is *not* an acceptable alternative.

(2) You may not employ mass counter-terror (as opposed to selective counter-terror) against the civilian population, i.e., genocide is not an alternative.

(3) You must maintain, to the greatest extent possible, production on the area's plantations, because continuation of this production is vital to Centralia's economy.

Step 7: Specify, for the objective(s) selected, the solution concept you would utilize to attain, in whole or part, the objective(s) within the assessed situation. Consider only those resources you have available. Spell out during your description of the solution, the reasons or considerations which led you to select/devise this particular solution.

Step 8: Describe the types and amount of national resources you would request to meet the *same situation* and discuss bases for requesting these particular resources.

COUNTERINSURGENT OBJECTIVES

1. To *discover* the hard-core leadership, organizational apparatus, and operational procedures.
(Examples: infiltration, prisoner interrogation, air photographs, analysis of captured documents, area-wide registration of personnel, rewards for information.)
2. To *deny* materiel resources to insurgents.
(Examples: food and weapon control programs, search and restrain procedures, curfews, restricted zones.)
3. To *destroy* insurgent guerrilla forces and leadership.
(Examples: raiding operations, detention and deportation, ambushes and counter-ambushes, full-scale combat operations, disguised combat patrols.)
4. To cause *defection* from insurgent forces, underground, and insurgent sympathizers.
(Examples: continuous patrolling operations, resettlement centers, land at low cost, encourage rivalry among insurgent leadership, execute welfare programs among insurgent relatives and sympathizers.)
5. To *protect* area government's functionaries and information concerning the personnel, their plans, and their activities.

Appendix B

(Examples: establish counterintelligence organization and program, relocation of government functionaries, protective custody, assigning personal bodyguards.)

6. To *increase* quantity of the area government's human and materiel resources.

(Examples: organize civil defense units, draft personnel into armed forces, hire experienced administrative personnel, establish volunteer programs, purchase necessary materiel, increase production of materiel.)

7. To *improve* quality of the area government's human and materiel resources.

(Examples: training programs, improved selection procedures, efficient organization and procedures, inspection and quality control regulations.)

8. To *protect* the area's population.

(Examples: resettlement of personnel, "strategic hamlet" concepts, defense of villages.)

9. To *provide* essential materiel and non-materiel resources to the population.

(Examples: establish new marketable crops, construct roads for transport of produce, low-interest loans, medical programs, educational and training programs.)

10. To *persuade* passive population members to support the area government and to reinforce active supporters of the area's government.

(Examples: equitable taxation, sound welfare programs, honest government, equal justice, participation of people in shaping government policies.)

SECTION I

CENTRALIA NATIONAL LEVEL BACKGROUND

Centralia, a New Jersey-sized Latin American republic, was, until recently, a colony of Great Britain and still retains a great deal of political and economic dependence on the former mother country, although only about half of the population speaks English or identifies culturally with England. This linguistic and cultural cleavage reflects the division of Centralian society into three main ethnic groups—the Creoles, the Ladinos, and the Indigenes—a division that affects all dimensions of the country's life. These ethnic groups (which also tend to reflect racial groupings) may be described as follows:

THE CREOLES

Culturally anglicized and English-speaking Negroes account for about one-half of Centralia's population. The Creoles (who were given favored treatment by the British colonial government) are politically and culturally the dominant native ethnic group. The civil service, police and army and school teaching posts are almost entirely staffed with Creoles who have monopolized Centralia's limited higher educational facilities to the exclusion of other groups. Most industrial workers are Creole as well. Although there are distinctions between the Creole social classes, they tend to share a common fear and dislike of the Ladinos and a contempt for the Indigenes—attitudes which are often reflected in government policies toward these minority groups.

THE LADINOS

Racially related to the Indigenes, but Spanish speaking and culturally related to the Hispanic American area, the Ladinos are immigrants into Centralia from Montanya and comprise over one-fourth of the population. Both government regulation and Creole prejudice have served to keep the Ladinos in a subsidiary social, political and economic status with few Ladinos active in government service or in industrial work. The bulk of the Ladino population forms the rural proletariat which provides the labor pool for the foreign-owned plantations. This labor pool is constantly increasing with the addition

of people of Indigene origin who are (by adopting the Spanish language and western-style dress) moving into the Ladino cultural orbit. These *New Ladinos* form an extremely unstable group due to the loss of their Indian traditions and the failure to have as yet fully assimilated the Hispanic traditions.

THE INDIGENES

The aboriginal inhabitants of Centralia have been pushed back into enclaves in the hills and jungles by the encroachments of the Creole and Ladino immigrants. While the Indigenes are considered by both groups to be inferior beings, they can, by adopting new customs, pass into the Ladino group, while no such acceptance is possible for a former Indigene among the Creoles. The Indigenes live in small autonomous villages in the rain forest and have little contact with the Centralian government. Economically, they depend on subsistence agriculture, although overpopulation is forcing many Indigenes to work as day laborers on the plantations. Now less than one-fourth of Centralia's population, the Indigenes are decreasing in relative numbers (although increasing in absolute terms) both because of their high mortality rate and because large numbers of young people are going to work on the plantations and becoming Ladinoized. However, the bulk of the Indigene population remains isolated from outside contacts, speaking only their native Kekchi language and maintaining traditional customs that differentiate them from the more westernized ethnic groups.

A dependent economy with most large business in foreign hands, Centralia depends on foreign subsidies (English and American aid) to balance its budget while trying to achieve at least minimal economic advancement. British private capital controls the bulk of the country's industry and commercial agriculture. Industry is concentrated in the national capital and is of minimal importance to the economy, employing only a few thousand workers, with stevedoring on the docks providing the only other major "industrial" employment. Two unions, one democratic in orientation, the other Communist-controlled, are competing to organize the small proletariat. While government policy had been to tolerate union activity as long as it posed no threat to the position of management, recent successful strikes (in spite of which wages remain low) have led to employer pressure on the Centralian government to clamp down on organizational activity, while company propaganda has indiscriminately smeared all union activity as Communist. The effect of the anti-union campaign has been to damage the poorly organized democratic union in its battle for control of the workers with the communists which have not par-

ticularly been hurt due to their strong organization. However, Communist expansion has been limited by the fact that union affiliation generally reflects ethnic group membership, with Creoles in the democratic union and Ladinos in the Communist-controlled union.

Agriculture is the largest sector of the economy and exports of agricultural products provide the bulk of Centralia's foreign exchange, making the economy vulnerable to shifts in world market prices. Market crops are primarily grown on huge foreign-owned plantations employing Ladino and Indigene laborers who are little better than peons. The Creole-run democratic union has made no effort to organize this rural labor force (partly because of the ethnic differences involved) but the Communist Party (CCP) has set up peasant unions on many plantations and has won considerable popular support. Attempts to strike for better wages have been ruthlessly suppressed by the employers (who have an association which blacklists radical workers) increasing the bitterness of the laborers. The Government makes occasional half-hearted reform efforts but it is popularly believed that the officials entrusted with this task have been bribed by the plantation managements. The government faces a mean dilemma—it is dependent on the foreign monetary exchange produced by the plantation exports and knows that any effort to regulate the activities of the owners is likely to have them pull out their investments for more favorable areas, yet social pressure is building up for major reforms in the system. The fact that most plantations are British and American owned, puts even greater pressure on the Government to go slow against them rather than stir up criticism in the foreign press.

Centralia's international relations have been oriented toward the western bloc and Centralia's pro-American stance has led to increasing friction with the neighboring Communist-controlled country of Montanya. The latter has five times the area and ten times the population (2½ million versus 250,000) of Centralia and correspondingly greater economic and military power. Montanya has long claimed Centralia as part of its territory, citing both juridical and ethnic factors (about half of the population of Centralia, the Indigenes and the Ladinos, is culturally affiliated to the population of Montanya) in support of this stance. The Communist-dominated regime in Montanya has revived these claims to Centralia and, while deterred from direct military action by the threat of western intervention, has covertly supported insurgent activities by the CCP.

Montanyan-supported insurgency poses a real threat to the Centralian government because the ethnic divisions of Centralia are clearly reflected in the political dynamics of the country with the government dominated by a single party representing the interests of

Appendix B

the Creole population and ignoring the needs of the Ladinos and Indigenes. While voting for representatives is by secret ballot and there is universal adult suffrage, the party in power is known to manipulate elections to maintain its control, and there is considerable popular disillusionment (especially among the Ladinos) with democracy. In their disillusion, the Ladinos have extended support to the Centralia Communist Party (CCP), which has been kept an ethnic party almost totally Ladino in membership (a few Creole intellectuals have joined but most of its Creole members are misfits and incompetents), because of its identification with Montanya. Through its front groups—the labor union and the peasant league—the CCP has carried out a vast amount of propaganda and agitation work among the Ladinos. Its slogans have been based on calls for democratic elections, higher wages and better working conditions for the proletariat, and land redistribution to the peasants and expulsion of foreign “colonialists” (i.e., the British plantation owners) from the economy. It has tried to play down its Marxist aims and its affiliations with the Montanyans but has not been successful in this effort. The CCP has built up an underground apparatus in the union and the peasant league but its penetration of the government has been minimal and it has little or no influence in the Creole-dominated army and police.

The national level balance of forces at this point can be summarized as: The Centralian Government is supported by the majority of the Creole community and also receives the support of the foreign business community and of the British and American governments. The Communists have the support of the Ladinos, especially those organized in the labor unions and the peasant leagues, and are also covertly supported by the government of Montanya. There remains, however, a considerable block of Centralian society that supports neither side. This block includes much of the Creole middle class and the non-unionized Ladinos who, while anti-government, are not pro-Communist. The Indigenes have remained outside of the power struggle tending to take “a plague on both their houses” view of the opponents and only having an interest in their own safety and well-being.

SECTION II AREA LEVEL BACKGROUND

Centralia is divided into six administrative districts of which Toledo is the smallest in area and population and the most backward economically. The district is roughly forty miles long by sixty miles wide, approximating a U.S. county in size. The District has a diverse and complex geography with a basic division between the coastal plain and the interior mountain-plateau zone. While the plain is either cleared for agriculture or is covered with uninhabitable swamps and scrub bush, vast areas of the uplands are so mountainous as to make extensive agriculture impossible and are still covered with virgin rain forest. Even in areas of Indigene cultivation only small tracts (the so-called milpas) are actually planted in crops at any one time with most of the land (the “wamil”), regaining a tree cover during the seven-year fallow period. The ecological differences between the plain and the plateau are reflected in the distribution of the ethnic groups within the district. These groups are the same as in Centralia as a whole, but are present in a significantly different ratio to each other than in the national average. The Indigenes comprise over 50 percent of the population (opposed to under 25 percent in the national average) and inhabit villages scattered in the uplands and the surrounding plain. The Ladinos form 30 percent (25 percent nationally) of the population and are concentrated on several large plantations located on the plains, while the Creoles comprise only 20 percent (opposed to 50 percent nationally) of the population and are concentrated in coastal towns and along the road inland from the district capital to the mountains. Creoles are the major exception to the rule that each ethnic group occupies a specific geographical region to the exclusion of other groups as there are Creole Government administrators, police, plantation foremen and guards living in what are predominantly Ladino and Indigene areas. However, these intrusive Creoles do not integrate with the groups where they are living and consequently have little communication with Ladinos or Indigenes outside of their official duties. The fact that the Creoles rarely speak any language but English, while the Ladinos generally know only Spanish, and the Indigenes are monolingual in Kekchi (when they do learn a second language it is Spanish), is a further limitation on communication between the ethnic groups.

Appendix B

The politically significant cleavage in the district population is that between ethnic groups. There is a strong hostility between the Ladinos and the Creoles, and only somewhat less animosity between the Indigenes and the Creoles. Relations between Ladinos and Indigenes are somewhat ambiguous but there is less hostility between the two groups than between either of them and the Creoles. The government is dominated by Creoles and its actions have generally favored this group at the expense of the others with the result that in the Toledo district, almost the entire Creole population is pro-government. Although some Ladinos have succeeded in local commercial activities, political and social status are denied them by the Creoles. The economic and social division between the groups is emphasized by the differences of language, culture, race and religion. Politically, this anti-Creole attitude is reflected in the general disaffection of the Ladino population from the Centralian government and the sympathy felt by them toward the Ladino home country of Montanya. Ladinos have long supported the Centralian Communist Party and form the core of its front labor and peasant unions which are active in the large plantations of Dolores and Big Falls. Even those Ladinos not organized in Communist-controlled fronts, are anti-government and support CCP activities of an insurgent nature. While most of the Indigenes are apolitical and wish only to be left alone, some of the younger men have become involved with the CCP peasant union while working as plantation laborers and will aid insurgent activity, and the Indigenes, as a whole, tend to identify more closely with the Ladinos than with the Creoles who are viewed as totally alien and representative of the repressive government.

SECTION III

AREA LEVEL GOVERNMENT

The operational area commander for the district is the District Commissioner (D.C.), an official appointed to the post by the national government. The District Commissioner has his headquarters in Punta Gorda. He functions both as the chief executive officer and as the judicial officer for the district. There is no local legislative power, as the national parliament is the only body authorized to enact laws. However, in time of a state of siege—which the District Commissioner can declare for 90 days with longer periods requiring parliament's approval—the D.C. is empowered to issue decrees with the force of law in his district.

In carrying out his plans the D.C., as operational area commander, may utilize the following forces.

MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FORCES

ARMY

Strength: one battalion on garrison duty in district capital. Its four companies are under strength—100 men each.

Morale and Training: morale low. Soldiers are urban Creoles, untrained for jungle combat or for counter-guerrilla operations.

Firepower: shortage of automatic weapons. No organic artillery. No reliable air support.

Transport: ten 2½-ton trucks, four jeeps, one L-19 observation plane based at Punta Gorda, no water craft, off-road mobility bad; comparative mobility of Army and insurgents indicated on Trafficability Chart.

Communications: headquarters set and four jeep-mounted transceivers operate on police net frequency; no back-pack sets.

Public Relations: army feared by non-Creole population because of past bad behavior, foraging for food and molesting native women.

NATIONAL POLICE

Strength: chief, five officers and non-coms and ten police constables (PC's) in Punta Gorda; single PC's stationed in San Antonio, Baranco, San Pedro Landing and Crique Sarco. All police are Creoles.